Biodefense & Food Supply Safety

Disease-carrying travelers still a threat

It is now eighteen months since the Andrew Speaker saga: Despite having drug-resistant tuberculosis, and although his name appeared on no-fly lists, Speaker managed to fly to Greece for his wedding, travel to Italy, and come back to the United States; GAO says some improvements have been made, but problems remain

Biosafety Lab-Level 4 dedicated in Galveston, Texas

The $174 million, 186,267-square-foot lab will employ 300 people; the lab is one of two approved in 2003 by NIH (the second is being built in Boston); critics question placing a BSL-4 lab on a barrier island vulnerable to hurricanes

Anti-bioterror programs may make U.S. more vulnerable

There are 14 BSL-4 labs in the United States (6 already in operation; 3 completed but not yet operational; 5 under construction), and 15,000 scientists authorized to work with deadly pathogens; critics argue that by vastly increasing the number of researchers and labs authorized to handle deadly substances, the government has made the U.S. more vulnerable to bioterror attacks

Briefly noted

ESTA Authorization required for all visa waiver countries as of 12 January... Georgia vet school leak kept quiet... Microsoft infuses "long awaited" with new meaning

The ethics of treatment during pandemic

It is more or less agreed that during the outbreak of a pandemic or a bioterror attack, those deemed "essential" to the functioning of the society should receive treatment first; but how do we define "essential"?

Google offers flu-tracking tool

The tool developed by Google.org, the company's philanthropic department, uses search terms that are commonly entered into the Internet to work out possible flu clusters

1918 U.K. Spanish flu records help in solving future pandemics

The 1918-19 Spanish flu killed more than fifty million people worldwide; Aussie scientists study record of the flu out break in the United Kingdom in search for answers about the pandemic quick spread and lethality

Briefly noted

RSA uncovers IT secure fears stifling business innovation... DHS completes radiological/nuclear detection drill in southeast transportation corridor... Has pandemic complacency come home to roost?

Briefly noted

Massive overhaul of U.S. immigration services planned... USDA awards CRI $50 Million counter-terrorism and security support services contract... Unisys wins DHS contract... European intrusion detection market - what are the future trends?

Biodefense and food supply safety

Avalanche of drugs, scarcely any oversight, I

By the time St. Louis Children's Hospital called in its infectious-disease specialist on 4 January to diagnose a mysterious spike in allergic reactions to kidney dialysis, it was clear there was a major problem. Three patients had become ill after taking the blood-thinning drug heparin. One had developed the same reaction during a dialysis treatment in November. Minutes after dialysis needles punctured their veins, the boy's lips and eyelids swelled. Their blood pressure dropped, and their heartbeats raced at dangerous levels.

The Chicago Tribune's David Greising and Bruce Japsen write that when infectious-disease specialist Dr. Alexis Elward honed in on the problem -- putting high on her list the drug made by Deerfield, Illinois-based Baxter International -- she became the first doctor to alert the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).

Biodefense and food supply safety

Avalanche of drugs, scarcely any oversight, II

Yesterday we wrote about the growing discrepancy -- a yawning gap --between the sheer amount of drug and food imported into the United States, and the resources available to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to inspect these imports and the companies which manufacture them to make sure they meet U.S. safety and health standards. Instead, U.S. drug companies, battling mightily to protect public health and their corporate reputations -- and congressional pressures -- often step in where FDA inspections have not. The Chicago Tribune's David Greising and Bruce Japsen write that Baxter, for example, attempted to do so: In September 2007 a Baxter team visited the Chinese plant from which it was buying herapin. By that time, though, timelines produced by Baxter, the FDA, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) show the suspect heparin already was making its way through the Baxter supply chain.